

Literature and Psychology

THE QUARTERLY NEWS LETTER OF THE CONFERENCE ON LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

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In writing "Ulysses," Joyce sought to make a serious experiment in a new, if not wholly novel, literary genre. He takes persons of the lower middle class living in Dublin in 1904 and seeks not only to describe what they did on a certain day early in June of that year as they went about the City bent on their usual occupations, but also to tell what many of them thought about the while.

Joyce has attempted—it seems to me, with astonishing success—to show how the screen of consciousness with its ever-shifting kaleidoscopic impressions carries, as it were on a plastic palimpsest, not only what is in the focus of each man's observation of the actual things about him, but also in the penumbral zone residua of past impressions, some recent and some drawn up by association from the domain of the subconscious. He shows how each of these impressions affects the life and behavior of the character which he is describing.

What he seeks to get is not unlike the result of a double or, if that is possible, a multiple exposure on cinema film which would give a clear foreground with a background visible but somewhat blurred and out of focus in varying degrees.

—From the opinion of Federal District Judge John M. Woolsey in the case of "United States of America, Libellant, versus One Book Called 'Ulysses,' Random House, Inc., Claimant." [This decision was rendered twenty-five years ago; viz., Dec. 6, 1933.]

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In our Winter 1958 issue (VIII, 1, 13) we reported the receipt of the experimental edition of a textbook for a course at Drew University entitled "Psychology Through Literature." The co-editors, Professors Obler and McClintock, represented, respectively, the Departments of English and Psychology. Dr. Obler's introductory essay, which bears the title above set forth, is in the nature of a survey of the field and is also a statement of position. In both aspects it seemed admirable as one of the papers for the program of the first meeting of the new Discussion Group. It should be noted, however, that the text

here presented is somewhat longer than what the author will be able to present orally at the meeting.

Dr. Obler received his bachelor's degree from the American University and his master's from Columbia. His doctoral dissertation at Rutgers was entitled "Modern Criticism in Action." For the past five years he has been associated with Drew, where he is now an assistant professor.

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The Editor reviews the fifth annual volume of *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, edited by Warner Muensterberger and Sidney Axelrad.

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Offprints and contributions received, together with material from recent publications in both fields.

Program for the

FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF DISCUSSION GROUP GENERAL TOPICS 10

To be held at the Meeting of the Modern Language Association of America, on Sunday, December 28, 1958, from 9:15 to 10:30 a.m., in the Pan-American Room of the Hotel Statler in New York City.

I. Business Meeting

1. Shall the publication of Literature and Psychology be continued under the auspices of this Discussion Group? Are there any suggestions for its future form, content, and financing?
2. Report of the Advisory and Nominating Committee.
3. Election of officers and committees for 1959.

II. Presentation of Papers

1. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF LEOPOLD BLOOM

by Joseph Prescott, Associate Professor of English at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan.

Ever since writing his doctoral dissertation on Joyce at Harvard in 1944, Professor Prescott has been delving even more deeply into analysis of the text, manuscript, typescript, and proof sheets of the works of Joyce. His studies have been published in Great Britain, France, Italy, Argentina, and Australia, as well as in the United States. His study of "Stylistic Realism in Joyce's Ulysses" was read at the triennial congress of the International Federation for Modern Languages and Literatures at Heidelberg during the summer of 1957. On his return to the United States he presented "The Characterization of Stephen Dedalus" at Discussion Group Comparative Literature 1 at the Madison, Wisconsin, meeting of MLA. He will continue his analyses of the characterizations in Ulysses by a paper on Molly Bloom at the triennial conference of the International Association of University Professors of English in Lausanne, Switzerland, next August.

2. PSYCHOLOGY AND LITERARY CRITICISM: A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

by Paul C. Obler, Assistant Professor of English at Drew University, Madison, N. J. Presentation based on the paper pre-printed infra, at pp. 50-59.

III. Discussion

1. Prepared discussion, led by Martin Kallich, English Department, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, and William Wasserstrom, English Department, University of Rochester, New York.

2. Discussion from the floor based (a) on the papers presented, (b) on contents of recent issues of Literature and Psychology, and (c) on general topics, in the order named. Each speaker will be limited to three minutes in all. Members who cannot attend may submit brief statements in writing, which will be read or summarized by the Secretary.

OFFICERS FOR THE 1958 MEETING

Chairman: Wayne Burns
Secretary-Editor: Leonard F. Manheim
Associate Editor: Eleanor B. Manheim
Editorial Committee: Louis Fraiberg (1960), Helmut Gerber (1959), Simon Lesser (1958).
Advisory and Nominating Committee: Leon Edel, chairman; Joan Corbett, Harry Bergholz.

ANNOUNCEMENTS, COMMENTS, AND CORRESPONDENCE

** This is the last issue of LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY to be sponsored by the Conference on Literature and Psychology, which is about to go out of existence after eight annual meetings. If its successor, Discussion Group General Topics 10, decides to continue sponsorship of this journal, Volume IX and subsequent volumes will appear under a revised masthead.

** As he did in 1957, your Editor attended another annual meeting of a national scholarly organization this past September, this time the meeting of the American Psychological Association in Washington, D. C. Once again the weather was not conducive to sustained scholarly activity, but we nevertheless submit for the record the designations of papers and symposia which may be of interest to our readers, those marked + being based as usual on title only:

+ Edwin S. Zolik of Marquette University delivered a ten-minute paper on "An experimental investigation of the psychodynamics of the 'previous existence' fantasy."

+ The Division on Personality and Social

Psychology conducted a symposium on "Creative Behavior and Intelligence" under the chairmanship of Dr. Abraham Carp, psychologist for the United States Air Force.

+ Norbett L. Mintz of Brandeis University delivered a paper for the Division on Esthetics "On the relations between the psychology of esthetics and clinical psychology."

The Division on Esthetics conducted a symposium on "Influences of depth psychology on literary criticism," under the chairmanship of your Editor, whose opening comments dealt with a historical account of "Some recent developments in the inter-disciplinary field of depth psychology and literary criticism." Other papers in the symposium were:

"The Ages of Man: Psychological Explorations in Literature," by Paul C. Obler of Drew University (both on behalf of himself and of James C. McClintock of Drew, who was unable to be present),

"Literature as Art and as Knowledge," by Paul Swartz of the University of Wichita, Kansas,

"The Appeal of Fiction to the Psyche of the Reader," by Simon O. Lesser.

The Division on Clinical Psychology conducted a symposium under the chairmanship of Frank Auld, Jr., of Yale, on "Roads to the Unconscious." Participants were

Jacob Levine of the Veterans' Administration on "Humor as an expression of the unconscious,"

Robert H. Knapp of Wesleyan on "Esthetic preference and personality dynamics,"

Mr. Lesser again on "Fiction and the unconscious,"

Lester Luborsky of the Menninger Foundation on "The study of personality dynamics through dreams."

+ The Division on Esthetics conducted a symposium on "The Study of Art as the Study of Man," under the chairmanship of Leonard Carmichael, head of the Smithsonian Institution.

+ The Presidential Address of the Division on Esthetics, by Rudolf Arnheim of Sarah Lawrence College, was entitled "The Wooden Saint and the Robin: On the Ontological Status of Art."

Readers who are interested in the content of any of these papers are invited to establish direct contact with the author or with the chairman of the sponsoring group.

** Cooper Union, starting its second century of Forum Programs in the Great Hall with an investigation of "the development of our great relatively untapped resource, the creative man..." is devoting a series of Wednesday evening programs to

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CREATIVITY

By the time this issue reaches our readers it will be too late to attend most of these free lectures or to hear them re-broadcast over New York's municipal radio station WNYC on Thursday evenings at 9 p. m. It is therefore interesting to note that the programs on tape will be available to the National Association of Educational Broadcasters for use on its nation-wide radio network and that tapes are also available at the Cooper Union Library by arrangement with the Librarian in charge. Whether this arrangement would include inter-library loan, your Editor does not know, but hazards the guess that it might be worth trying.

** No letter which an Editor receives gives him as much pleasure as a pleasant acknowledgment from the author of a rejected manuscript. It is in the nature of a tribute to your long-suffering and hard-working Editorial Committee that we quote the following:

I should like to acknowledge and express my appreciation for your long letter... which accompanied my manuscript.... It is both gratifying and inspiring to receive such a packet of thoughtful criticism and suggestions from you and your readers, and I am especially grateful for the reading list. I have set right to work

at it, though the revision may be some time in coming....

I cannot tell you how stimulating it is to receive such a letter; I thank you and your readers most heartily for your time and effort....

Another:

I was very pleased to get your letter concerning the... article. It was certainly kind of you to write me such an explanation. I have long admired the way you started and nourished Literature & Psychology, and your letter adds to my good opinion.

So send along your contributions. If you get nothing else, you'll get a considered critique and commentary from highly competent and industrious readers.

** Psychoanalyzing the psychoanalyst dept.—A reader comments on your Editor's review of The Romantic Agony in the last issue (VIII, 4, 45-46):

Thanks for letting me peer into your psyche and trace the relaxation of your scholarly father fixation on Prof Praz. Now he seems to arouse the same sentiment in you that a poor relation did in Elia.

** Adam G. N. Moore, son of the late Dr. Merrill Moore, announces that he has available for free distribution a number of reprints of his father's medical papers as well as some poetical items. A postcard specifying the category in which the writer is interested should be sent to Mr. Moore at 10 Crabtree Road, Squantum 71, Mass. [Your Editor announces that he has available for free distribution a number of copies of "Poet and Psychiatrist Merrill Moore, M. D.," by Henry W. Wells, reprinted from the December 1955 issue of The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease.]

** Abstracts of English Studies, founded in January, 1958, and now reporting on the contents of 264 publications (including LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY), was adopted this fall by NCTE as an official publication. Twelve issues a year cost \$4; single copies are fifty cents, and orders may be sent to NCTE at 704 South Sixth St., Champaign, Ill. Incidentally, several of our subscribers are now abstractors for this promising young journal, among them our indefatigable Hal Gerber.

** It was in order to save space for more vital matters that we discontinued the publication of our List of Subscribers. Readers may be interested to note, however, that our subscription list not only spans the United States from Washington to Florida, and includes libraries and individual subscribers in Great Britain and on the continent of Europe, but that it has now been extended to include a (library) subscriber in Japan. Does your library subscribe? Have you a colleague, not necessarily in your own department, who might like to know about us? Back issues are all available once more, although it is not possible to say for how long.

PSYCHOLOGY AND LITERARY CRITICISM:
A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

We can begin thinking about the relationship between psychology and literature by first recognizing that there is not one psychology, but several psychologies, and that any statement regarding the relationship should clearly designate which psychology is involved. Then too, we should notice that these psychologies in their relationship to "literature" may really be focusing, separately or in combination, on (a) the psychology of the artist who created the work; (b) the psychology of the audience responding to the work; (c) the work itself—the characters and situations which comprise its plot and the language which comprises its texture.

The Psychology of the Artist

The fundamental assumption behind an interest in the artist's psychology is genetic: the psychologist and/or literary critic assumes that the work of art cannot be understood fully until its origins are defined and evaluated. The ancestry of this emphasis on poetic inspiration may be traced to Plato's *Ion* where we get a view of the poet later propagandized by the Romantics. It is the view of the poet as a possessed instrument, a divine madman:

For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corymbantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus, but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dens of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles.

This view of the writer, we have said, attracted those nineteenth-century Romantics who saw art as a highly personal, essentially irrational experience. At the very least, the Romantic aesthetic prepared the way for subsequent psychologizing of the poet by underscoring the uniqueness and "apartness" of the artistic sensibility behind the created work. Although, for Wordsworth, the poet is "a man speaking to men," the poet is also a man "endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind. . . ." Wordsworth's Preface or equally Shelley's *Defence* raises to a higher power the role of poet *qua* poet.

The result is similar in Emerson's conception of the poet as seer and priest and Carlyle's view of the poet as hero. Further, theories which had poetry taking "its origins from emotions recollected in tranquillity," i. e., theories of poetry which seemed to trace the poem's source to a rather precise psychic occurrence, place the critic under some obligation to attempt a synthetic duplication of the poet's original experience. In the history of literary criticism this obligation was met by the production of better literary biographies. Strong ethical and "scientific" drives merged in the late nineteenth century to produce biographies like Dowden's *lives of Shakespeare* (1875) and Shelley (1886) and Masson's monumental *Life of Milton* (1859-1880)—works which attempted to place the author against the background of his social and literary "scene." Later, Strachey's "debunking" biographies were the antidotes necessary to counteract the respectable Victorian desire to think well of contemporary eminent personages. Twentieth-century positivism ushered in a flurry of biographies based on Freudian psychoanalytic readings of the poet's personality, like Edward Carpenter's *The Psychology of the Poet Shelley* (1925) and Van Wyck Brooks' *The Ordeal of Mark Twain* (1920), in which the works were regarded as so much "evidence," or were "explained away" into a neurosis. But for the most part, the more impressive contributions came from scholars who were more patient, meticulous, and devoted than ever before, and who were concerned with neither debunking nor with purifying the author, but with presenting the facts as objectively, yet gracefully, as possible. As might be expected, the biographers tended to deal with the lives of those Romantic writers who conceived their works as a sort of recorded confession. Here the relationship between art and life is so close as to seem to merge. In the lives of the subjective writers, Herbert Read notes, "the works grow naturally out of the recorded events, or are in themselves simple events: the facts explain the art, and the biography is merely a synthesis." In the same vein F. L. Lucas writes that Byron's life was the most "poetic" of all his works, and Bennett Weaver is especially outraged that the "heresy" of Ambrose Bierce—"A work of the imagination must be judged entirely apart from the personality which produced it"—should be applied to Shelley.

We have alluded to early psychoanalytic studies of the lives of Shelley and Twain. When psychoanalysis thus occupies itself with the personality of the writer, it may be regarded as a supplement—often as a corrective supplement—to the biography which concentrated on the level of conscious intentions and factual evidence. Freud himself had a deep commitment to the nineteenth-century tradition of positivistic rationalism. A corollary of this commitment was Freud's tacit allegiance to the doctrine of causality: hence his focus in his own references to art on the "temperament of the artist as man." To Freud and his more orthodox followers (who unfortunately seldom combine the talents of psychoanalyst and literary critic with a sen-

sitivity equal to Freud's) the "most characteristic aesthetic question," as Douglas Morgan observes, "...is an inquiry into the personality factors which condition the creation...of works of art."¹ It was Freud's view that the meaning of a work of art is its intention. The intention and, simultaneously, the "real meaning" of the work could be discovered by careful psychoanalysis of the artist's personality. Fortunately, the task is made somewhat simpler by reference to a number of generalized assumptions which Freud made about artists and the creative process. These assumptions have often been summarized, and we need review them only briefly here.²

According to Freud, the artist, a being of "introverted disposition," transfers his sexual energies out of the realm of reality to the world of fantasy and wish-fulfillment. The danger of remaining in the cosmos of the day-dream is apparent—that is "the way which might readily lead to neurosis." But the greater artist can find his way back into reality; the "personal note" of his day-dreams, which "grates upon strange ears and becomes enjoyable to others," is moulded and modified and eventually lost. To the degree that the artist is successful in his creations, his day-dreams will be disguised and objectively dramatized so as to appeal to others. But what is the nature of this appeal? Why does the art work elicit pleasurable response?—These questions concern themselves with the psychological state of the audience reacting to the art work. Freudian aesthetic theory is founded on the axiom of the affective and genetic priority of sex. "I have no doubt," Freud writes in *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (1910), "that the conception of the 'beautiful' is rooted in the soil of sexual stimulation and signified originally that which is sexually exciting." Through an endless variety of disguises the fantasy-work overcomes the resistance of the "censor" and the frequently painful effects of consciousness by gratifying repressed tendencies. In addition, the rhythms of poetry offer enjoyment analogous to the "forepleasure" obtained from a variety of rhythmic sexual activities. Rhythm prepares for the easy reception of the poem in the mind of the reader; other structural elements of the art work perform a similar function by supplying an inner logic and harmony such as do not usually exist in the dream.

Freud's brilliant excursions into sculpture, painting, and literature were meant to illustrate the psychoanalytic method at work on "problems" in those fields. His monographs on Michelangelo, Leonardo, Dostoevsky, Goethe, and Shakespeare were soon aped by psychoanalysts interested in the arts and art critics interested in psychoanalysis.

The essay on "Dostoevsky and Parricide," first published in 1928 as a preface to the German edition of *The Brothers Karamazov*, is a fine example of Freud's procedure. Further, the essay's hints on the Oedipus complex of writers were later developed and then applied by Dr. Ernest Jones to *Hamlet* with much publicized results.³ At the outset, Freud assumes the creative greatness of Dostoevsky whom he places "not far behind Shakespeare." Then Freud's attention is drawn to Dostoevsky's epileptic fits: they seem only the

symptom of his neurosis." The fits are traced directly to the murder of the writer's father—a shocking event of Dostoevsky's eighteenth year. Buttressing his case with biographical evidence, Freud hypothesizes that Dostoevsky's hysteria resulted from the sudden realization of his death-wishes against his father. What he had wished for in fantasy became horribly real. Dostoevsky then suffered from an "extraordinary sense of guilt and of...masochistic conduct" for the rest of his life. His acceptance of undeserved punishment from "the little father, the Tsar," was a "substitute for the punishment he deserved for his sin against the real father." He hopes to find a way out of his dilemma by purging himself of guilt through partial identification with Christ. This identification enabled him to find a deep pity for the criminal—even, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, sympathy for the parricide. (See also "Notes from Underground" and "The Peasant Marey.") "It can scarcely be owing to chance," Freud observes, prefacing a brief but suggestive comparative study of "three of the masterpieces of the literature of all time," that "the Oedipus Rex of Sophocles, Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, and Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*...should all deal with the same subject, parricide. In all three, moreover, the motive for the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, is laid bare.

Freud's view that *The Brothers Karamazov* represents Dostoevsky's "confession" of his parricidal tendencies is paralleled by Dr. Jones's contention that *Hamlet*'s "meaning" can be uncovered when we recognize a similar tendency on the part of Shakespeare. In theory at least, Jones equates the intention of the work with the intention of the artist. He is certain that "all serious critics" realize "that the appreciation of a work and an understanding of its intention are only heightened when it is related to some knowledge of its author's characteristics and to the stages in his artistic de-

- 1/ Douglas Morgan, "Psychology and Art Today: A Summary and Critique," *JAAC*, X (1950), 83. Reprinted in *The Problems of Aesthetics*, edited by Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger (New York, 1953).
- 2/ See, for instance, Frederick J. Hoffman, *Freudianism and the Literary Mind* (Baton Rouge, La., 1945), Chapter I; Edward Glover, *Freud or Jung?* (New York, 1956), Chapter X; Gregory Zilboorg, *Sigmund Freud* (New York, 1951), pp. 9, 11-12, 21-23, 72-81.
- 3/ Ernest Jones, *Hamlet and Oedipus* (London, 1949). The *Hamlet* essay was written in 1910 "as an exposition of a footnote in Freud's 'Traumdeutung' (1900)." But Freud's own work on the Oedipus complex, as in the Dostoevsky essay, undoubtedly helped to prepare for the reception of Jones' work. In the Preface to the 1949 *Hamlet and Oedipus*, Jones writes, "Somehow or other the news that such an interpretation of *Hamlet*'s difficulty exists has spread fairly widely, and I have frequently had to express my regret to would-be students that their wish to read the original account has been so hard to gratify (p. 9)." For a critique of the Jones thesis see Francis Fergusson, *The Idea of a Theatre* (Princeton, 1949), reprinted as a Doubleday Anchor Book, 1953).

velopment." Jones disagrees with the theory that the work of art is an ontological entity, "a finished thing-in-itself, something almost independent of the creator's personality." He cites with approval Masson's defense of the biographical analysis of Shakespeare: "not till every poem has been, as it were, chased up to the moment of its organic origin, and resolved into the mood or intention...out of which it sprang, will its import be adequately felt or understood."

The Jones essay on Hamlet is but one of many problems "solved" by Freudian and neo-Freudian analysts like Sandoz Ferenczi, Theodore Reik, Fritz Wittels, Marie Bonaparte, Otto Rank, and Hanns Sachs. The numerous articles on literary matters in the pages of such professional journals as The Psychoanalytic Review, American Imago, and Psychiatry tend to explore further paths previously uncovered by Freud or one of the "disciples," and they illustrate the continued vitality of the orthodoxy. But probably an equally large quantity of work utilizing Freudianism is by literary critics. ⁴ As the doctrine spread to the intellectual centers of England and America during the twenties (most effectively publicized in those countries by Jones and A. A. Brill), critics variously conversant with psychoanalytic theory applied it both to specific authors and to their works and discussed its theoretical possibilities for the creation and analysis of literature. With few exceptions, the earlier Freudian criticism of the twenties and thirties was inferior and mechanically applied. Stanley Edgar Hyman speaks of "the amateur sexologists and Peeping Toms of criticism" writing during those decades, and the indictment does not seem too severe. Looking back at some early dalliances with Freud by people like Thomas Beer, Joseph Wood Krutch, Edward Dahlberg, and Van Wyck Brooks—to list only a few American critics—one is astonished to recall that they were once regarded seriously by those few of the populace who read criticism. What seems worse—the lack of humor and the pretentiousness of tone in these essays remind us that they were taken seriously by their authors also. That is why Krutch's confident reduction of the complexity of Poe's art to "an abnormal condition of the nerves" does not cause so much annoyance as embarrassment.

Yet the net result of those early efforts with Freud has not, perhaps, been so bad after all. Through studious re-valuation the former naive application of principles and the ready acceptance of theories came to be questioned. Thus, taking as representatives of the late thirties and forties certain of the essays of Edmund Wilson, Thomas Mann, Auden, Trilling, Burke, Muller, and C. S. Lewis, we see recognition of Freud's tremendous value for literature and for literary criticism, but now are added some notes of caution. Trilling, for instance, in "Art and Neurosis," argues that writers are more accessible to psychoanalytic interpretation than others only because they have confessed themselves in their art; Trilling finds nothing inherent in artistic activity which derives it from neurosis. It is significant to observe that most of the critics appearing in Literature and Psychology, while generally committed to Freud, nevertheless utilize insights from Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, and even the Gestaltists, Behaviorists, and Personalists.

In the latter connection essays like Gardner Murphy's "Creativeness" and Gordon Allport's "Personality: A Problem for Science Or A Problem for Art?" may be taken as other sensible correctives to psychoanalytical excesses typified by Bergler's essay on "Writer's Block." All creative geniuses, Murphy contends, share traits in common; the sensitivity and patterns of creative skills which he ascribes to creative artists in particular in no way need stem from neurosis. By understanding the general nature of artistic behavior, we come to see the artist not as an individual apart, whose behavior pattern is determined, but as a more articulate member of society, or, as Louis MacNeice writes in Modern Poetry, "a specialist in something which everyone practices." At the same time, we can also see the artist as someone whom our society has not always treated kindly; the essentially practical concerns of our society contribute to making all but a very few of the art guild second-class citizens. "All the conditions of happiness are realized in the life of the man of science," writes Bertrand Russell:

He has an activity which utilizes his abilities to the full, and he achieves results which appear important not only to himself but to the general public, even when it cannot in the smallest degree understand them. In this he is more fortunate than the artist. When the public cannot understand a picture or a poem, they conclude that it is a bad picture or a bad poem. When they cannot understand the theory of relativity they conclude (rightly) that their education has been insufficient. Consequently Einstein is honored while the best painters are (or at least were) left to starve in garrets, and Einstein is happy while the painters are unhappy. Very few men can be genuinely happy in a life involving continual self-assertion against the skepticism of mankind, unless they can shut themselves up in a coterie and forget the cold outer world.... The artist... is in the painful situation of having to choose between being despised or being despicable. ⁵

From which we may conclude that if the artist is sick, then society can help cure him by first curing itself.

The Psychology of the Audience

In concerning himself with the psychology of the audience, the critic is dealing with the immediate effect the art work achieves and, ultimately, with the values he thinks art communicates. Plato had contended that the effect of art is corrupting because art

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- 4/ Ever since it was founded in 1951, Literature and Psychology has been attempting a compilation of psychoanalytic books and articles dealing with literary matters. Special attention should also be called to the excellent anthology of critical essays edited by William Phillips, Art and Psychoanalysis (New York, 1957).
 - 5/ Bertrand Russell, The Conquest of Happiness (New York, 1930), Chapter X.

nourishes the passions. Aristotle, replying to Plato in The Art of Poetry, asserts that art does not nourish the passions but gives them therapeutic purging, or katharsis. He illustrates the concept of mimesis, which along with the stylistic elements constitutes the poetic process, in terms of the effect made on the audience:

The reason why men enjoy seeing a picture is that in contemplating it they are incidentally learning and drawing logical inferences in their recognition of particulars, as when they exclaim, "Ah, that is so-and-so!"

Implicit in Aristotle's concern with the achievement of aesthetic effect is the notion of art's social function: he was defining in more exact fashion the sources of the "pleasure and profit" which art was assumed to yield. Horace's doctrine of "pleasure and profit," was, of course, repeated innumerable times, and is still a criterion of criticism.

Concern with the effect of the art work has led some psychologists and critics to the rather extreme position where the poem is assumed to be identical with the mental experience of the reader. Each poem is a highly personal experience—the net result of the education, religious background, personality, and particular mood of the reader. It is readily seen that this position leads to countless interpretations of "productions" of "Ode to a Grecian Urn," all of which are equally valid. Although patently absurd, the logic of de gustibus non est disputandum is frequently repeated by those who should know better. In Behaviorism (1925), for instance, J. B. Watson derides all objective criteria for the judgment of art works:

If I had to pass critical judgment upon a work of art, a picture, for example, I should do it experimentally. I should arrange to let crowds of people from all walks of life wander one at a time into a well-lighted room. I should have rival stimuli about, such as magazines, knick-knacks of one kind or another, two or three pictures on the wall, including the one I wanted to have judged. If an individual under observation spent time at this picture, if he showed some emotional reaction such as grief, joy, rage, then I should put him down as reacting positively to it. At the end of the day I should be able to say: 'The so-called art critics will say your picture is terrible, the children will not look at it, the women are shocked by it, but the traveling salesman chuckle with glee over it. It will be a failure if you exhibit it; I should advise you to send it to some sales manager and let him hang it over his desk.'

Watson's visceral test for art is akin to what Wimsatt and Beardsley call the physiological form of the "affective fallacy." /6 A. E. Housman, in The Name and Nature of Poetry (1933), also locates poetic sensation in "the pit of the stomach." In addition, Housman has another physiological reaction which signals the presence of great poetry:

Experience has taught me, when I am shaving of a morning, to keep watch over my thoughts, because, if a line

of poetry strays into my memory, my skin bristles so that the razor ceases to act. This particular symptom is accompanied by a shiver down the spine; there is another which consists in a constriction of the throat and a precipitation of water to the eyes....

The kinds of physiological reactions recorded in the presence of the art work may be indefinitely extended to include suffocation, extreme cold, shudders, and scalping. But plainly these diverse reactions are too idiosyncratic for those psychologists and critics interested in defining general effects created by the art work. By a variety of laboratory experiments, most of them performed during the latter part of the nineteenth and first quarter of the twentieth centuries, various investigators attempted to measure objectively the psychological and physiological effects of art.

The work of I. A. Richards took up where these investigations left off. But before he came to this work in Practical Criticism (1929), Richards, with T. S. Eliot and J. C. Ransom, helped sketch the theoretical outlines of modern literary criticism. In the words of Stanley Edgar Hyman, "What we have been calling modern criticism began in 1924, with the publication of Principles of Literary Criticism." It would be informative to begin a discussion of Practical Criticism by placing it in the context not only of the Principles, but also of Richards' writings in psychology, semantics, philosophy, and education. Somewhat fortunately, however, such a task is beyond the scope of this essay; fortunately also, several lengthy discussions of Richards are available. /7 For our immediate purposes, a brief account of Practical Criticism will suffice.

Practical Criticism presents the results of an experiment Richards conducted with undergraduates at Cambridge, most of whom were reading English for honors. Richards distributed groups of four "unknown" poems per week and asked the students to read the poems as many times as they wished, keeping track only of the number of different times they began their reading. They were also asked to write comments which Richards called "Protocols" on the poems. The protocols were handed in voluntarily, and in the class discussions which followed, Richards neither revealed the authors of the protocols nor indicated his own reactions to the four qualitatively graded poems. The second, and longest, section of Practical Criticism presents samples of the protocols on the thirteen poems. Each poem is given a chapter, with the protocols subdivided into various reaction categories. The first section of the book, the Introductory, explains the experiment and raises its many problems. The third section discusses several major problems suggested by the protocols themselves.

6/ W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and M. C. Beardsley, "The Affective Fallacy," in Critiques and Essays in Criticism, edited by R. W. Stallman (New York, 1949), p. 403.

7/ See, for instance, Stanley Edgar Hyman, The Armed Vision (New York, 1948), Chapter II; Eliseo Vivas, Creation and Discovery, (New York, 1955), pp. 209-221; D. G. James, Scepticism and Poetry (London, 1937).

The last section consists of a summary and recommendations, plus appendices which include the poems (with authors indicated), a chart on the relative popularity of the poems, and further notes.

The general aim of Practical Criticism is the improvement of reading, particularly the improvement of literary reading:

That the one and only goal of all critical endeavours, of all interpretation, appreciation, exhortation, praise or abuse, is improvement in communication may seem an exaggeration. But in practice it is so. The whole apparatus of critical rules and principles is a means to the attainment of finer, more precise, more discriminating communication. There is, it is true, a valuation side to criticism. When we have solved, completely, the communication problem, when we have got, perfectly, the experience, the mental condition relevant to the poem, we have still to judge it, still to decide upon its worth. But the latter question nearly always settles itself; or rather, our own inmost nature and the nature of the world in which we live decide it for us. Our prime endeavour must be to get the relevant mental condition and then see what happens.

The loftiness of Richards' aims may be weighed against the shocking picture which emerged from the protocols. The students tended to reverse accepted judgments: the poems of J. D. C. Pellow and "Woodbine Willie" are more favorably regarded than those of Donne and Hopkins.

Richards' own readings serve as a standard of intelligence and sensitivity towards which all serious readers may strive. That there is much psychological superficiality in the methodology of Practical Criticism is not important. Nor has the real achievement of Practical Criticism anything to do with the tension of contradiction between his extreme psychologically based critical theory and his own critical practice: his theory precludes any reference to the poetic object, since for the object he would substitute subjective phenomena; yet his own readings imply the presence of objects which gave rise to the organization of subjective phenomena. What is important is what Practical Criticism achieved: the eventual revolution in the methods of teaching literature at the college level. The spate of "critical anthologies," led by the tremendously influential Understanding Poetry of Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, aims at close-in reading of the particular literary work. That the utilization of these texts has improved the reading ability of this decade's college students is as yet impossible to say; one feels, in all honesty, however, that if such texts—patiently worked over by both students and teachers—won't turn the trick, nothing else will.

Psychology and the Literary Work

Psychology comes into the production and analysis of the literary work in two ways: it interprets the characters of the work, adding to our insights into human nature from less methodized resources; it comments on other aspects of the work's structure, such as its rhythm, images, and form.

Psychoanalysis has been used at least as much to illuminate the behavior of characters in the work as it has been used to probe the motivations of the artist. Indeed, even a partial listing of works analyzed from this vantage point—one is tempted to say from the "depths"—impresses with its range. Certain works, of course, receive special attention; these are usually the same works which challenge critics of other than psychoanalytic persuasion: the Oedipus and the Orestes—Electra plays of Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Euripides; the "problem plays" of Shakespeare—Hamlet, Lear, Measure for Measure; the novels of Austen, Dickens, Dostoevsky, and Proust; certain short stories by Poe, Anderson, Kafka, and Tolstoi; poems by Eliot, Browning, Baudelaire, and Yeats. /8 Then almost in a special class are those modern writers like Mann, Aiken, Woolf, Lawrence, Joyce, and Sartre whose works obviously indicate an acquaintance with psychoanalytic theory. A book like Frederick J. Hoffman's Freudianism and the Literary Mind makes it clear that any serious reader of modern literature must have at least a rudimentary knowledge of Freudian psychology. The very forms of contemporary poetry, John Ciardi reminds us, "are a product of the poets' reactions to Freud." To Ciardi the "complex, multiple, self-crossing, self-colliding, and elusive" forms so characteristic of modern poetry (and of much modern fiction also, we might add) are a direct reflection of the "cross-tugging," elusive image of man as seen by Freud. /9

Although Freud has dominated the relationship between psychoanalysis, literature, and criticism, he has not monopolized it. Adler has directly influenced some writers, particularly Phyllis Bottome, who has devoted a whole book of essays, Not in Our Stars, to interpreting Adler's system. The Victorian scholar Jerome Hamilton Buckley, in his study of William Ernest Henley, used Adler's notion of "masculine protest" to interpret Henley's character as it was affected by a painful bone-tuberculosis. Leon Edel, in a recent paper on Willa Cather's novel, The Professor's House, utilized some ideas of Harry Stack Sullivan. /10

The recognition of Jung's value for literature and criticism has been increasing greatly since 1930 when he contributed an article on "Psychology and Poetry" to Eugène Jolas' Transition. But his emergence from Freud's large shadow has been most gradual: in a 1938 questionnaire-symposium conducted

- 8/ Reference to the indexes to Literature and Psychology heretofore published (to Vols. I-V, and to Vol. VI) will reveal the fact that certain authors, including some of those here mentioned, have been treated far more frequently than others.
- 9/ John Ciardi, "Freud and Modern Poetry," SR, XXXIX, 18 (May 5, 1956), 8.
- 10/ Leon Edel, "Willa Cather's The Professor's House: An Inquiry into the Use of Psychology in Literary Criticism," L&P, IV, 5 (Nov. 1954), 69-79; now included with few alterations in Professor Edel's published Alexander Lectures at the University of Toronto: Literary Biography (1957), Chapter IV.

by that magazine, almost none of the artists and critics participating had any notion of Jung's suggestive concept of the collective unconscious. The publication of Miss Maud Bodkin's Archetypal Patterns in Poetry in 1934, the pioneer work which attempted to utilize the Jungian theory of archetypes and to apply it to literary criticism, went almost neglected by the literary magazines and found its most enthusiastic reception in journals of psychology and folklore. ^{/11} Indeed, Jung's reputation has perhaps been most enhanced by the rather pervasive influence of the so-called Cambridge School of Classical Anthropology. The conclusions of Sir James Frazer, Jane Harrison, F. M. Cornford, Gilbert Murray, and Jessie Weston, which were arrived at by applying the findings of comparative anthropology to the origins of Greek drama and the Grail legend, seemed "scientifically" to echo the mystique of the archetype. To Northrop Frye, for instance, The Golden Bough is above all a study in literary criticism which illustrates the expression of recurring symbols and patterns common to primitive and modern cultures because they are basic in human experience. Frye himself has done much to explore the fruitfulness of Jung's work. In an issue of The Kenyon Review for Spring, 1950, Frye asserted that the conception of the archetype is "based on the fact that literary education is possible, and that the understanding of individual works of art expands into an understanding of literature as a whole. . . . The person who has attained a mature understanding of literature, beyond dilettantism and pedantry, understands it archetypally, whether he himself realizes this or not." In a sense, Frye's statement, taken together with Herbert Read's appreciative summation of "Jung at Mid-Century," ^{/12} symbolizes the present necessity for a re-valuation of Jung as an independent thinker of profound significance. The Bollingen Series Jung and some recent attempts at popular interpretation perhaps indicate that such re-valuation has begun. And the recent work of deft and wide-ranging critics like W. H. Auden, Kenneth Burke, Leslie Fiedler, William Troy, and Joseph Campbell seems a sure sign of Jung's "arrival" in a vital corner of the literary scene. ^{/13}

The focus of Jung's aesthetic differs from Freud's in that it is placed not so much on the artist as on the art object. Jung supplies an excellent psychological rationale for concentrating attention on the work. We may pass over Jung's early departures from Freud, such as his doubts about infantile sexuality and his "genetic" interpretation of libido (as expressed in The Theory of Psychoanalysis), which tends to make it synonymous with undifferentiated energy. Of far more pertinence is Jung's sharp divergence from Freud on the nature of individual creative expression.

Freud, to use Jung's own words, brought the work of art into "questionable proximity" with the neurosis which is said to have produced it. To Jung, only when the work of art was "primarily personal" did it deserve to be treated as if it were a neurosis. ^{/14} But should this seem necessary, it was a sign that the work in question was less than a work of art. "The personal idiosyncrasies that creep into a work of art are not essential; in fact, the more we have to cope with

these peculiarities, the less it is a question of art." ^{/15} Jung conceived of the artistic disposition as one which involves "an overweight of collective psychic life as against the personal." Given such a disposition, the poet's own desires are subordinated to the collective will, to the unconscious psychic forces of mankind whose shaping instrument he is. The poet's attitude about the origin and the development of his poem is of little consequence: "his own work outgrows him as a child its mother. The creative process has feminine quality, and the creative work arises from unconscious depths — we might say from the realm of the mothers." ^{/16} The individual conscious ego of the artist is helpless in the "subterranean currents" of the collective creative power. "It is not Goethe who creates Faust, but Faust who creates Goethe." For this reason the great work of art must be objective and impersonal: it expresses something to which whole peoples respond in a state of "participation mystique" — at "that level of experience at which it is man who lives, and not the individual."

However transcendental Jung's view of the creative act may seem, its emotional appeal — perhaps because its vision is ennobling — is not deniable. Jung's view of the poem and of the response which the poem evokes is likewise suggestive, and it is ultimately of more significance for literary criticism. He attempts to define the quality common to all great art which induces the "participation mystique" in readers of diverse times and cultures. In his article, "On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetic Art," in his Contributions to Analytical Psycho-

^{11/} But see Mr. Lesser's recent review of the re-publication of Miss Bodkin's Archetypal Patterns. . . . (L&P, VIII, 3 [Summer 1958], 44-45) for a viewpoint which discounts the indebtedness of the work to Jungian theory as a whole. [Ed. note.]

^{12/} Herbert Read, "Jung at Mid-Century," HudR, IV (1951), 259-268.

^{13/} For example: W. H. Auden, The Enchafèd Flood (New York, 1950); Kenneth Burke, especially, The Philosophy of Literary Form (L. S. U. Press, 1941); "The Turn of the Screw as Poem," in The Story: A Critical Anthology, ed. by M. Schorer (New York, 1950). Also included in this anthology is Edmund Wilson's study of the James story from a Freudian viewpoint; thus a good contrast between a Freudian and a Jungian analysis is presented. See also Leslie Fiedler, "Toward an Amateur Criticism," KR, XII (Autumn 1950), 573. Fiedler believes that the archetype may rescue criticism from the "scientific critics," although he warns that "the myth approach is no panacea." Also, William Troy, "Thomas Mann: Myth and Reason," PR, V (1938), 24-32; 51-64; Joseph Campbell, The Hero With a Thousand Faces (New York [Bollingen], 1949). The works of G. Wilson Knight should also be properly be mentioned here.

^{14/} C. G. Jung, "Psychology and Literature," in Modern Man in Search of a Soul, (New York, 1933), pp. 193-194.

^{15/} Ibid., p. 194.

^{16/} Ibid., pp. 196-197.

logy (1928), Jung speaks of the special emotional significance possessed by certain poems—a significance which goes beyond any definitely conveyed meaning—and which he attributes to the awakening in the reader's mind, "within or beneath his conscious response, of unconscious forces" which he terms "Primordial images" or "archetypes." Jung further describes the archetypes as "psychic residua of numberless experiences of the same type." Therefore, because man's neurological structure is essentially, everywhere and at all times, the same, he is rendered liable to essentially the same kinds of experiences. Professor Cornford had discussed and summarized this concept as soundly and concisely as one could wish:

We are assured that the individual mind, though in one sense it forgets all but a tiny fraction of its experience, in another sense never forgets anything—not even experience of which it was not, at any time, aware. Similarly, the memory of a race, enshrined in a continuous tradition of myth, legend, poetry, retains knowledge which, after a sufficient lapse of time, no individual can formulate in abstract terms. The knowledge is not blotted out, though you may say it is forgotten; it lives on in symbol and in image, and finally, as it were, fossilized in metaphor, as a system linked together by chords of association that vibrate without the interposition of rational, direct thinking.... The study of the unconscious contents of contemporary minds is bringing to light the fact—however it is to be explained—that people to-day, in their dreams, use the symbolism of the primitive mythical themes, such as rebirth, death, and resurrection, eating the god, and so on—symbolism that often coincides in surprising detail with the universal myths. /17

Cornford and Jung would hold that the uncovering of a mythic, archetypal pattern or image in a work of literature indicates that what it communicates is important or valuable, a fundamental human concern, since men of all times in all places have evidently felt the need to express it and to have it expressed. "The creative process," writes Jung, "in so far as we are able to follow it at all, consists in an unconscious animation of the archetype," and "the secret of effective art," he adds, is a "shaping of the primordial image.... a translation into the language of the present which makes it possible for every man to find again the deepest springs of life which would otherwise be closed to him."

How then does the concept enable the critic to approach the literary work in a way hitherto usually neglected? For one, it demands that he focus much attention on that part of the work which is anchored in the "tradition"—a task formerly thought fit only for scholars. /18 He comes to realize that writers speak not altogether from their individual thoughts and feelings, but rather from their deeper minds in communion with other minds of past times. Perhaps only the conscious, deliberate intention of utilizing the past differentiates the moderns—Eliot, Joyce, Yeats, and Faulkner as a group. /19

The critic who makes use of the concept believes that, in a sense, the creative process is one in which the writer dips into the collective unconscious whose fundamental patterns give shape and structure to the seemingly chaotic images of his own dream world. The particular art work is then, in Kenneth Burke's term, an "individuation of a form," a reworking of a mould already found in "local" and/or universal myth. Thus we can say that a book about the rise to fame of a Lana Turner or Babe Ruth is, first, an individuation of the American ("Rags to Riches") version of the Cinderella myth which is in turn an individuation of the archetypal pattern of rebirth. In summary: we may distinguish between myth and universal myth or archetype by noting that the latter term encompasses the former, that myths are themselves frequently individuations of archetypes. /20

The study of Frazer and Jung challenges one to attempt a definitive listing of the fundamental archetypal patterns and the chief primordial images. Several beginnings toward such a classification have been made; /21 yet, like all new concepts this one brings into focus a glossary which is still somewhat fluxional. Eventually, as the theory is refined, no doubt some of the vocabulary will be "anchored," some terms will shift meaning, others will disappear altogether. Miss Bodkin discusses this problem at the close of

17/F. M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy (London, 1912), pp. 78-79. Note that Cornford's book antedates Jung's statement of the concept; an example, we must assume, of an idea in the wind.

18/See T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in Selected Essays (New York, 1932), pp. 3-12. Eliot gave a new meaning to the word "tradition"—but in a way both the Cambridge people and Jung would approve.

19/See W. Y. Tindall, Forces in Modern British Literature (New York, 1947), pp. 360-368 ("Myth and the Natural Man") for a good concise coverage of how modern British writers employ myth. Richard Chase, in Quest for Myth (L. S. U. Press, 1950), approaches the use of myth in contemporary literature, analyzing Yeats' "Among School Children," Auden's "In Sickness and in Health," to illustrate how myth was used as a ready-made form on which new poetry was built. Maud Bodkin's newest book, Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy (1951) attacks Schweitzer's Autobiography, Saint-Exupéry's Flight to Arras, and Koestler's Arrival and Departure. Her most detailed studies of poetry here are on Yeats' "The Second Coming," and Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral.

20/The tendency to use "myth" for "archetype" and vice versa has led to much confusion. Many persons also use "myth" when they mean "legend" or "fable." Examples: "the Christian myth," the "myth" of Atalanta and the Golden Apples. The vocabulary on this entire subject needs clarification.

21/See, for example, Norman Friedman, "Imagery: From Sensation to Symbol," JAAC, XII (Sept. 1953), 25-37. Campbell's book cited above is appealing in its attempt to erect a kind of super mono-myth. See also: Robert Graves, The White Goddess (New York, 1948).

her most recent work, Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy, /22 but she seems to raise more questions than she solves.

Many of Jung's concepts have been attacked as being "scientific rubbish," but even if they are bad science (in the sense that they are not subject to quantitative verification), they are equally, as C. S. Lewis has observed, "excellent poetry." "In this immense vision," writes Herbert Muller concerning the Jungian collective unconscious, "all symbols become cloudy, splendid for poetry, but useless for science." The present inability of "science," however, to test the validity of the concept by available present methodology need not affect its value for criticism. Quite the contrary: the very admission of its poetic appeal necessitates its careful consideration for use in criticism. We should be willing to admit, perhaps, that the value of any concept depends largely on the extent of its meaningful reality to those who approach it. And in that case the discussion of the scientific quantification of Jung's hypotheses is beside the point.

Yet, dangers remain. First, there is the possibility that Jungian criticism, given its inherent mysticism, might diffuse into a personal impressionism. Then there is the chance that the uncovering of an archetypal pattern or image might become an end in itself, unrelated to the structural organization of the work as a whole. A corollary of that possibility would be the dangerous ignoring of what the aestheticians call the normative problem. The lack of concern for aesthetic evaluation is plainly manifest among those psychoanalysts to whom the "bad" poem is as equally revealing as the "good" poem. /23 We need not assume that all Jungians would be immune to this practice.

But, by and large, the possibilities Jung suggests for psychoanalytic criticism are great and are still being tapped. Some critics, especially Fiedler, Frye, and Campbell, seem attracted to the exploration of archetypes in a work of literature because, first, the archetype is to be discovered inside the work. It has been said of Yeats that he is "a magical poet who has found a way of arranging concrete symbols that shall awaken in us huge shadows of our wonder." The discovery of an archetype, these critics claim, performs a similar service; they come to understand a little more clearly why the art work is emotionally satisfying. They learn to see the particular work as an individuation of a form which was shaped by men everywhere long dead: they come to acquire what Eliot calls "the historical sense;" they begin to ask themselves why literature of one age makes Satan a hero, or why Billy Budd should be a "Christ figure."

Not all psychological insights into the characters of a work stem from psychoanalysis. Harold Grier McCurdy, for instance, attempts an essentially statistical analysis of characters in which some use is made of the list of psychical traits developed by R. B. Cattell. Behind McCurdy's attention to fictional characters, however, is the conviction that such attention can reveal "in an objective way" much about the author's personality. /24 The writer of fiction, asserts McCurdy, "appears to convey in his work (as the dreamer in his dream) his experience

of the world as selected and colored and strongly shaped by his own particular nature. It is from this point of view that analysis of the literary work is simultaneously analysis of the personality which produced it." The persistent presence of any theme or character-type "should, theoretically, be counted as an important feature of the author's personality, whether or not it is traceable to historical circumstances known to biographers." McCurdy's most lengthy application of his personality analysis method was to the character of D. H. Lawrence as revealed in thirteen major novels. /25

The statistical method of literary analysis has been applied with far more success to the images to be found in a particular work. In Shakespeare's Imagery Caroline Spurgeon's chief aim is the same as McCurdy's: the dominating images of the plays are examined to see what kind of man they reveal. Her critical assumptions, too, are no different from McCurdy's:

In the case of a poet, I suggest it is chiefly through his image that he, to some extent unconsciously, 'gives himself away.' He may be, and in Shakespeare's case is, almost entirely objective in his dramatic characters and their views and opinions, yet, like the man who under stress of emotion will show no sign of it in eye or face, but will reveal it in some muscular tension, the poet unwittingly lays bare

22/Type-Images . . . , p. 174. She notes that some other terms have been suggested, criticizes Jung for his explanation of archetypes, and finds her own "type-images" most useful for the present. She cites Karl Mannheim's suggestion of the word "paradigmatic" experience, which she finds "repellent."

23/The psychoanalysts' ignoring of the normative problem has frequently been criticized. See, for instance, W. H. Auden's "Psychology and Art," in The Arts To-day, ed. Geoffrey Grigson (London, 1935). Auden writes: that the psychoanalyst "in his treatment of symbols and facts . . . fails to explain why of two words dealing with the same unconscious material, one is aesthetically good and the other bad; indeed . . . few psychoanalysts in their published work show any signs of knowing that aesthetics standards exist. (p. 10)"

24/Harold Grier McCurdy, "Literature and Personality," Char. & Personality, 7 (1939), 300-308; "Literature as a Resource in Personality Study: Theory and Methods," JAAC, VIII, 1 (Sept. 1949), 42-46.

25/H. G. McCurdy, "Literature and Personality: Analysis of the Novels of D. H. Lawrence," Char. & Personality, VIII (March 1940), 181-203; VIII (June 1940), 311-322. McCurdy finds that in novel after novel Lawrence presents a conflict between characters who are "literally and metaphorically" dark and light. He traces this persistence of character types to Lawrence's "dark, passionate father, and blond ambitious brother," idealized by Lawrence's mother. Cf. Daniel Weiss, "Oedipus in Nottinghamshire," L&P, VII, 3, 33-42.

his own innermost likes and dislikes, observations and interests, associations of thought, attitudes of mind and beliefs, in and through the images, the verbal pictures he draws to illuminate something quite different in the speech and thought of his characters.

The imagery he instinctively uses is thus a revelation, largely unconscious, given at a moment of heightened feeling, of the furniture of his mind, the channels of his thought, the qualities of things, the objects and incidents he observes and remembers, and perhaps most significant of all, those which he does not observe or remember.

What Miss Spurgeon is saying here is that, in Kenneth Burke's phrase, "Images never lie." But what do they never lie about, the work which they constitute or the person who put them down? Miss Spurgeon's Shakespeare is somebody too virtuous for every young girl to dream about, "the troop-leader of the Stratford boy scouts," Stanley Edgar Hyman calls him. The cluster of disease and corruption images which Miss Spurgeon demonstrates as one of the most prevalent in play after play unaccountably leads her to conclude that "no man could have written his images on sickness, surfeit, gluttony, dirt and disease, who had not naturally a strong feeling for healthy living, a liking for fresh air and 'honest water,' and who was not himself clean, temperate and healthy." Those critics who use what we may call the "tic method" of literary analysis on the work and only with much caution on the author have done some extremely suggestive work. ²⁶ Kenneth Burke, for instance, has proposed that the word statistical be equated with the word symbolic. If certain images are repeated often enough, they become "representative;" they point to what the work is really getting at whether or not the author is aware of what he "intended."

In Burke's criticism the artistic "situation" is equivalent to the author's "motivation." But he works back and forth between these equivalents with more than usual dexterity; the great virtue of his criticism is that it always works from the work out, and that the work is never beyond hailing distance. It is in the general area of study which is concerned with both the symbol and man as a symbol-making and symbol-using animal that psychology, literature, and criticism can come together most felicitously.

Formalist Critique of Two Psychological Methods of Literary Analysis

The formalist critic decries psychological criticism as "positivistic." He contends that psychoanalytic, or at least Freudian, criticism, by holding that the "real meaning" of the art work is discoverable by careful psychoanalysis of the artist's personality, raises the entire question of any biographical evidence in interpreting the work.

For those biographers who have pondered the question at all, "the critical significance of biographical evidence" ²⁷ rests on the Aristotelian assumption that we can know a thing only when we know its cause. Since the principal cause of the literary art work is most obviously its author, there can be little doubt that our knowledge of his bio-

graphy adds to our understanding of his work. But, unless we postulate that the author was somehow a being in isolation, for whom we need know only the facts of, in Carlyle's phrase, "vacuum biography," we cannot escape the conclusion that the art work is a complex amalgam of physical facts and political, social, and economic conditions filtered through the highly individualized assimilatory system of the artist. Thus, the aim of biographical criticism is to rediscover and restore these factors, and, further, to organize them into a synthesis which re-creates the author as a human being whose works may be understood "as the expression of specific needs and influences." ²⁸ The aim, of course, is a manifestly impossible ideal, and the formalist questions the critical validity of the resulting approximations.

First, how logical is the tacit assumption that the sum of innumerable "known" biographical factors plus an admitted additional number of unknown biographical factors equals the state of the poet's mind at a given moment of composition? Such an equation naively presumes that there exists a one-to-one mechanical relationship between the poet and the poem: it tends to ignore the private and unpredictable in human behavior. Equally fallacious seems the ready admission of the avowed intention of the author as irrefutable evidence which can corroborate the biographer's reconstruction of the poetic experience. As Wellek has pointed out, the intentions of the poet are often "a posteriori ratiocinations, commentaries which certainly must be taken into account but also must be criticized in the light of the finished work of art." ²⁹ Frequently also, the gap between the announced intention and the eventual achievement is such as to invalidate any critical judgment of one based upon the other. T. S. Eliot has wisely refused to join the notorious collection of artists who have misinterpreted their own works, by asserting that "what a poem means is as much what it means to others as what

²⁶/See, for instance, the work of G. Wilson Knight (The Wheel of Fire, The Imperial Theme, The Shakespearean Tempest), Edward Armstrong (Shakespeare's Imagination), Theodore Spencer (Shakespeare and the Nature of Man), and Cleanth Brooks' essay on Macbeth in The Well Wrought Urn. All of these works owe an obvious debt to Miss Spurgeon's study.

²⁷/The phrase is taken from the symposium title of the English Institute Annual for 1946.

²⁸/Harold Cherniss, "The Biographical Fashion in Literary Criticism," U. of Cal. Pubs. in Classical Philol., XII (1933-34), 286.

²⁹/René Wellek, "The Mode of Existence of a Literary Work of Art," in Critiques, ed. Stallman, p. 216. For a forceful rebuttal see Leon Edel, Literary Biography (U. of Toronto Press, 1957), Chapter III, "Criticism." "To force our attention back to the text is a good thing; the close reading of that text is the beginning of all literary study, but it is not the end of it. The text cannot be an 'appendage' to the biography of the poet, for it is an integral part of it..." (pp. 49-50)

it means to the author." /30 But the whole matter of the "intentions" of the artist has been argued at length elsewhere and need not be further entered into here. We need only recognize that the suspicion with which many critics now view the biographical approach to literature is a general reversal of previous attitudes. Critical attention has come to be focused on "not what the work is made out of but what it is made into," and that there is a concomitant feeling that the comprehension of the novel or the poem may not be impaired by an ignorance of biographical data; this is most clearly demonstrable with the older poets of whom we have little more than bare dates, the anonymous poets, and the writers of our time whose work we feel we can understand without trying to pierce the veil which covers their intimate lives.

More to the point where psychoanalysis is concerned, the formalist raises these questions: Does the psychoanalytic critic who insists that the art work may be best examined through investigation of the artist's hidden, often unconscious, motivations evade the primary responsibility of criticism to analyze and/or evaluate the work? Has such a critic permitted himself, in the words of C. S. Lewis, "to be diverted from the genuinely critical question 'Why, and how, should we read this?' to the purely historical question 'Why did he write it?'—and that, too, in a sense which makes the word 'why' mean not 'with what intention?' but 'impelled by what causes?'" /31 In other words, psychoanalytic criticism with a biographical focus shifts our attention from an aesthetic analysis of "what" the poem is, to a psychological explanation of "why" the poem is. The formalist's answer to Herbert Read's claim that "a complete understanding of the poet's personality is the best basis for the appreciation of his poetry" is: (1) Appreciation is not criticism: (2) Criticism is by definition concerned with critical values, not with ethical or psychological values. Criticism is concerned with the art work, not with the author's personality. Biography—whether it dismisses Freudian insights or uses them to advantage—is not criticism.

"Critical remarks," says I. A. Richards, in the Principles, "are a branch of psychological remarks" and "no special ethical or metaphysical ideas need be introduced to explain value." If this statement were true, then ethics would be abrogated to science and the aesthetic experience could be accounted for in measurable sensory effects. When rhythm becomes "expectancy," something which we are told to think of "as a very complex tide of neural settings, lowering the threshold for some kinds of stimuli and raising it for others," when, in short, the objective categories employed to describe the work are dismissed, then the art object begins disappearing. The formalist, of course, insists that there is something called "a pure aesthetic object." He does not consider that a poem is "nothing but 'words'," for he realizes that of course the poem's intrinsic meanings must derive from non-aesthetic sources, the outside world. But these meanings are communicated through the total

poem and must be read as such by the reader. If the reader uses the poem to find meanings, which are not in the poem but outside it, then he is reading the poem as a communication intended to increase the storehouse of knowledge.

"Let us both grow together..."

Acceptance of the formalist position in literary criticism does not mean the banning of psychology from the critic's stock-pile. Recently Cleanth Brooks reiterated his concern that "the literary historian and the critic need to work together and that the ideal case is that in which both functions are united in one and the same man." /32 Just as the formalist does not reject history, but makes use of history for criticism, he can make use of psychology. But he cannot delude himself into thinking that psychological evidence is critical evaluation. He tries to see the poem clearly before him and does not mistake it for psychology or history or something else which it is not. What this suggests may be restated thus: to define the "situation" of a literary work the formalist might employ psychological terminology just as he would employ any key metaphor in describing the work. (Thus, Chaucer's Troilus can be explained in terms of courtly love, and Hamlet can be explained by the Oedipus complex.) The scientific validity of the metaphor need not concern him because he is not concerned with the work's "truth" in terms of any set of extrinsic correlatives.

The psychologist who makes "use" of literature is also making use of literature metaphorically. Because of this, he must draw psychological, "scientific" conclusions most cautiously. Few psychologists would hold that any art work is a substitute for a living consciousness; to make synecdochal use of the literature to get at its author may be humanistic, but it is not scientific.

As long as he responds to these notes of caution, the psychologist is free to read as best he knows how: he may eventually read the poem as a poem, but meanwhile he need not fear that respectful attention will cause the poem to wither away.

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30/T. S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), p. 130.

31/C. S. Lewis, "Psycho-analysis and Literary Criticism," Essays and Studies, XXVII, 1941, Oxford, p. 18.

32/Cleanth Brooks, "A Note on the Limits of 'History' and the Limits of 'Criticism'," Sew. Rev., LXI, 1 (Winter 1953), 132.

BOOK REVIEW

Note: In response to requests that our bibliographical entries indicate more precisely, whenever possible, the degree of pertinence of the book or article cited to the field of psycho-literary criticism, the following symbols will hereafter be used (with the reservation that many of the works are cited by title or descriptive abstract only, since, in the absence of a bibliography committee with an adequate appropriation, it is impossible for the editors to read every item).

- * - The item seems to be directly pertinent to the field.
- & - Material covered seems to be tangential, either because it involves some art other than literature or some technique which is not wholly related to depth psychology.
- % - Psycho-literary criticism seems to be used in part of the work cited.

Warner Muensterberger and Sidney Axelrad, editors, — Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences. [Annual] Volume V. New York: International Universities Press, 1958. Pp. 297 (including Index). \$6.00.

It is a striking indication of present-day trends in matters that fall within our special field of interest that this annual, founded under its present title by the psychoanalyst-anthropologist Geza Roheim, announces in its present issue that its editors intend to change its future title to The Psychoanalytic Study of Society. Their reason for this shift, which is evident in the present issue under the old title, is set forth in their preliminary note:

We feel that PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES suggests too narrow a spectrum for the material representing the wide area of applied psychoanalysis. Applied psychoanalysis encompasses the humanities as well as the social and behavioral sciences... (p. 3)

Of the three sections into which the present issue of the annual is divided, two are directly related to literature and literary criticism, being devoted respectively to "Psychobiography" and "Communication." This review can best serve our readers by reporting the material thus collected in bibliographical form. The papers printed refer to a number of publications in the field which have not been referred to in past issues of our running Bibliographies.

The three papers on "Psychobiography" are led by a most interesting study with what seems to your Editor to be an unnecessarily pompous and repellent title:

*-Saul Rosenzweig, "The Idiocultural Dimension of Psychotherapy: Pre- and Post-history of the Relations between Sigmund Freud and Josef Popper-Lynkeus, 9-50.

Josef Popper, who wrote under the classic (and Faustian) pseudonym of Lynkeus, was an older contemporary of Freud, a theoretical mathematician and physicist, an engineer, a sociologist and economist, and, what is most amazing, the author of a single collection of short fiction,

*-Phantasien eines Realisten, von Lynkeus [pseud.]. Dresden: Reissner, 1899. (Second unchanged edition, 1900; revised edition, 1918.) The Chapter "Träumen wie Wachen," translated as "Dreaming Like Waking," by A. A. Brill (1947). [From Dr. Rosenzweig's Bibliography, p. 50.]

The second story in this collection, "Gährende Kraft eines Geheimnisses," is discussed in great detail by Dr. Rosenzweig and is re-

printed by him in full under the English title "The Offending Ear" (pp. 38-46). To your Editor the work not only seems "to anticipate Freud's dream theory" and to go "beyond Freud into areas that border on the so-called neo-Freudian revision," as Dr. Rosenzweig so ably and forcefully contends, but also to have a claim to our attention for its distinct literary merit and for its striking juxtaposition of the figures of Girolamo Savonarola and Niccolò Machiavelli.

Dr. Rosenzweig's Bibliography also contains, among other items:

&-L. Binswanger, Erinnerungen an Sigmund Freud (Bern: A. Francke, 1956),

*-A. A. Brill, Translator's Prologue to "Dreaming Like Waking," Psa. Rev., 34 (1947), 184-197,

&-Sigmund Freud, "Josef Popper-Lynkeus und die Theorie des Traumes" (1923), Ges. Werke, 13, 357-359 (London: Imago Publ. Co., 1940),

&- - - - "My Contact with Josef Popper-Lynkeus" (1932), Coll. Papers, 5, 295-301 (London: Hogarth Press, 1950),

&-Fritz Wittels, "Freud's Correlation with Josef Popper-Lynkeus," Psa. Rev., 34 (1947), 492-497.

The second biographical paper is of somewhat tangential interest:

&-K. R. Eissler, "Goethe and Science, A Contribution to the Psychology of Goethe's Psychosis," 51-98.

"This paper," writes Dr. Eissler in a footnote (p. 51), "is a revised version of [part] of an unpublished manuscript with the tentative title: 'Notes on Two Psychotherapeutic Experiences in Goethe's Life'." Dr. Eissler refers to another part of this unpublished work as containing "an instance of a psychotic episode in Goethe's younger years at Leipzig which I think had a beneficial effect upon his creativity." The present paper, which deals with Goethe's scientific writings on the theory of color, is said to be "an instance of the opposite [effect]." (p. 51)

The final biographical paper deals with a perennially fascinating subject,

&-Philip Weissmann, "Why Booth Killed Lincoln: A Psychoanalytic Study of a Historical Tragedy," 99-115.

Dr. Weissmann's historical research seems to be meagre. He places much reliance on a 1955 popular work by Bishop, "The Day Lincoln Was Shot."/* He refers to a previous paper on the same subject,

&-G. W. Wilson, "John Wilkes Booth, Father Murderer," Amer. Imago, 1 (1940), 3, 49-60.

In the section devoted to "Communication" is the essay which most directly concerns us:

*-Brian A. Rowley, "Psychology and Literary Criticism," 200-218.

Dr. Rowley, who read this paper as a Noon-Hour Lecture at University College, London, in 1954, and then delivered it again in revised form before the British Psychological Society in 1955, includes in his Bibliography some references we have never noted:

*-D. Brinkmann, "Romantik und Tiefenpsychologie," Universitas, 9 (1954), 749-754,

*-R. T. Clark, "The Psychological Framework of Goethe's Werther," JEGP, 46 (1947), 273-278,

*-H. Flournoy, "Poetry and Memories of Childhood," Intl. Jrnl. Psa., 31 (1950), 103-107,

*-O. Kučera, "The Mechanisms of Regression in the Poetry of Baudelaire and His Followers," Ibid., 31 (1950), 98-102,

%-Herbert Read, "Psycho-Analysis and the Problem of Aesthetic Value," Ibid., 32 (1951), 73-82,

*-Joan Riviere, "The Unconscious Phantasy of an Inner World Reflected in Examples from English Literature," Ibid., 33 (1952), 160-172,

*- - - , "The Inner World of Ibsen's Master Builder," Ibid., 173-180

*-M. L. Hourd, "Psycho-Analysis and Literary Criticism," New Era, 32 (1951), 138-141.

Other papers in the book which may have some interest for our readers are

&-Richard F. Sterba, "On Some Psychological Factors in Pictorial Advertising," 187-199,

&-Gerhart D. Wiebe, "Social Values and Ego Ideal: Recollections of the Army-McCarthy Hearings," 164-186,

and also, perhaps, the papers on anthropology and religion by Röhmeim, Bychowski, and Peto.

L. F. M.
*/ The Bibliography which follows Dr. Weissmann's paper refers to The Man Who Killed Lincoln, but the author, Phillip Van Doren Stern, is referred to as "Van der Stern, P.," another example of the execrable proof-reading which results in a reference at p. 21 (f.n. 4) to Catholic "cannon" law!

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

** Brief comment here does not preclude fuller review in later issues.

Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides) — The Preservation of Health (translated from the original Arabic and edited with an introduction by Hirsch L. Gordon.) New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 92 (no index). \$2.75.

[The Arabic-Jewish sage of medieval times, writing in the year 1198, "...discusses mild and drastic remedies...suggests music as a therapeutic measure and...discusses the interrelationship between mind and body, also hypersensitivity, philosophy and theoretical morality, the even keel, imaginary good and evil, and the desirability of emotional stability and optimism." (Dr. Gordon's Introduction, p. 12).]

Eustace Chesser — Live and Let Live: The Moral of the Wolfenden Report (with a foreword by Sir John Wolfenden). New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. (Printed in Great Britain.) Pp. 126 (including bibliography but no index). \$4.75.

[A psycho-sociological commentary on the Report of the (British) Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution. The bibliography includes Dr. Alex Comfort's 1950 study of Sexual Behavior in Society.]

E. F. McDaniel — Discovering the Real Self New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 117 (including bibliography but no index). \$3.75.

[Rear Admiral McDaniel ("U. S. N. [Ret.]") presents a "know-thyself" work which speci-

fically disclaims being a "peace-of-mind" book. He undertakes to aid "one-twelfth of the population of the United States [which] will become so incapacitated by their tensions that they will need assistance from a mental hospital" as well as "millions of others [who] suffer their tensions in silence" through application of the tenets of Korzybski and the school of General Semantics.]

Timothy Cooney — Ultimate Desires. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 100 (including source-notes but no index). \$2.75.

[The reader's enthusiasm for the task of discovering the nature of the author's version of "the non-cognitivist metaethical position" is dampened at the outset by the opening lines on the first page: "This short book is the first volume [sic] of a proposed two-volume [sic] work in ethics."]

Herbert A. Bloch and Arthur Niederhoffer — The Gang: A Study in Adolescent Behavior New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. xv+231 (including selected bibliography, index of names, and subject index). \$6.00

Joseph S. Roucek, editor — Juvenile Delinquency. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 8+370 (including source-notes and index). \$10.00

[It seems almost a pity that the scope of this journal does not permit us to review these enlightening (and horrifying) books. The first mentioned, the joint work of an

academic anthropologist-sociologist and a lieutenant of New York City police, opens a wide vista of speculation in its depiction of regression in the mores of the juvenile gang to the level of specific puberty rites in primitive societies.]

Henry L. Drake — The People's Plato (with a foreword by Manly P. Hall). New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. xxiii+633 (including bibliography, "documentation," and index). \$7.50.

[The dialogues; edited, rearranged, condensed, and partially rewritten.]

Manfred Sakel — Schizophrenia. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. vii+335 (including index of names). \$5.00.

[The originator of the insulin-shock treatment for schizophrenia discusses the disease picture, his concept of its etiology, and his mode of treatment.]

[Florence] S. Edsall — The World of Psychic Phenomena. New York: David McKay Co., 1958. Pp. ix+244 (including bibliography and index). \$3.95.

[“A comprehensive introduction to the realm of the hidden consciousness: trances, mediums, visions, apparitions, ghosts, telepathy, extrasensory perception, etc.” Thus the sub-title on the dust jacket. The approach alternates between the “scientific” and the sensational. The bibliography ranges widely, including a selection of works of literature, mainly minor. A regrettable omission is Thomas Mann’s “Okulte Erlebnis” and its later incorporation in Der Zauberberg.]

Arthur L. Wormhoudt — An Approach to Some Masterpieces of Western World Literature. Oskaloosa, Iowa: The Athene Press, 1958. (A paperback.) Pp. 69 (no index). \$.50.

[Although these studies “of literary art from a psychological and sociological point of view” seem to be arranged primarily for classroom use; they contain theoretical interpretations of many classics which seem to require close study in a longer review. Any volunteers?]

BIBLIOGRAPHY (XXXI)

For explanation of the symbols used on the entries in this and future Bibliographies, see the note on page 60, supra.

Abbreviations of the titles of periodicals conform, wherever possible, to the listing in the 1957 Bibliography issue of PMLA [LXVIII, 2 (April 1958), 105-114], the abbreviations used in Psychological Abstracts, and in the published indexes [I-V and VII of L&P].

Offprints Received

From Professor H. L. Ansbacher, editor of the Journal of Individual Psychology:

*-Sofie Lazarsfeld, “Did Oedipus Have an Oedipus Complex?” Amer. Jrnl. Orthopsych., XIV, 2 (April 1944), 226-229.

Professor Ansbacher comments:

[This] paper on the Oedipus complex... puts the whole matter in a refreshingly new light. It shows especially how Freud omitted what are possibly the more important aspects of the personality of Oedipus, in favor of the sexual.

.... [The author, who] is the mother of Paul F. Lazarsfeld, sociologist at Columbia, is a wonderfully young old lady and as one of the original Adlerians really knows her stuff.

Mrs. Lazarsfeld emphasizes the power-drive as the dominant motivating force in the conscious and unconscious actions of Oedipus:

Laius is not only a father but a king as well.... Within psychological interpretation “king” represents “power.” So we may conclude that Oedipus kills not just out of sexual rivalry, but that he is portrayed as slaying his father as an obstacle to power. Life and literature are full of this struggle between youth and old age, between father and son, the old barring the road, youth desirous of having their road free. [p. 229]

From Mr. Adam Moore (see also p. 49, supra):

*-Merrill Moore, “Ego” [a poem], Life and Letters To-day [London], No. 14 (October 1938). [Dedicated to Dr. Hanns Sachs]

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From the authors named:

%-Norman N. Holland, “Kafka’s ‘Metamorphosis’: Realism and Unrealism” [correcting the reversal of the title as originally printed in MFS, IV, 2 (Summer 1958) 143-150].

Professor Holland comments:

Although the article deals with a theological and allegorical reading of Kafka’s “Metamorphosis,” the last pages relate this reading to psychoanalytic studies. The result, I think, is a somewhat fuller significance than psychoanalytic readings alone would indicate.

%-Joseph Prescott, “A Preliminary Checklist of the Periodical Publications of Dorothy M. Richardson,” from A. D. Wallace and W. O. Ross, eds., Studies in Honor of John Wilcox, No. 15, pp. 219-225 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1958).

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Bibliographical contributions from Professor Helmut E. Gerber:

&-Barbara Hardy, “‘I have a smack of Hamlet’: Coleridge and Shakespeare’s Characters,” Essays in Crit., VIII (July 1958),

on which the comment is, "...repetitive and strained and negative and, I think, old hat,"

&-Norman Newton, "Yeats as Dramatist: THE PLAYER QUEEN," *Ibid.*,

*-R. P. Draper, "D. H. Lawrence on Mother-Love," *Ibid.*,

*-Ludwig Marcuse, "Freud's Aesthetics," *J A A C* (September 1958) [See also VII, 2, 30],

&-Campbell Crockett, "Psychoanalysis in Art Criticism," *Ibid.*,

&-John Hoppers, "Literature and Human Nature," *Ibid.*,

&-Clyde de L. Ryals, "Toward a Definition of Decadent as Applied to the Literature of the Nineteenth Century," *Ibid.*,

concerning which last-mentioned paper there is the following comment, "...I find [this article] less than adequate or accurate. [It should be considered] in connection with the recent review of Praz [*The Romantic Agony*; VIII, 3, 45-46]."

*-Lee, A. Van Der, *Zum literarischen Motiv der Vatersuche* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche U. M., 1958),

*-Nancy Hale, "What God Was Writing," *Tex. Qrtrly.*, I (Spring 1958), 35-40.

"A curious mixture," writes Professor Gerber, "of Freud, Jung, and Nancy Hale.... Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, according to Nancy Hale, symbolizes the author's 'inner life....' and the setting was that lady's own psyche." The negro symbolizes repressed instinctive sexuality, and his delivery from slavery symbolizes the delivery of 'the dark itself from the dark,' its 'deliverance into consciousness.' In the death of Little Eva is symbolized the repressive principle; the unregenerate Topsy lives and is equated with the id; Simon Legree is 'an evil aspect of the father archetype' and Uncle Tom is 'the beneficent aspect of the father archetype.' And so on. Mrs. Stowe was, of course, a very proper custodian of very proper Bostonian prudery, who was responsible for what amounts to slander about Byron but who apparently had guilt feelings strong enough to represent them in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, unconsciously, of course."

%-John H. Hagen, "The Duke's Children: Trollope's Psychological Masterpiece," *NCF*, XIII (June 1958), 1-21.

[Your Editor would have thought that Trollope's "psychological masterpiece" was He Knew He Was Right.]

Item for the "How-did-we-miss-it" dept.:

&-I. A. Richards, "Notes toward an Agreement between Literary Criticism and Some of the Sciences," in *Speculative Instruments* (University of Chicago Press, 1955), Piece I, pp. 3-16.

In the Foreword Professor Richards explains his unusual and witty approach:

...In the first piece I play with the suggestion that the present role of philosophy should be that of a Diplomacy attempting some mitigation of the conflicts between the opposing studies.

Any reader who likes to reverse it also and make it into a plea for a more enterprising and venturesome diplomacy between the nations will not be misreading. Many of the great metaphors are reversible. [pp. x-xi]

From Recent Journals

From *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*:

*-Phyllis Greenacre, "The Impostor," XVII (1958), 3, 359-382.

The author uses as clinical examples Titus Oates, "Rake" Rochester, George Psalmanazer, James Macpherson, Thomas Chatterton, and the Tichborne Claimant.

From the 1957 Report of the Bibliographical Committee of MLA General Topics VII: *Relations of Literature and Science*; editors, Kester Svendsen and Laurie Bowman Zwicky [including only items not previously noted]:

&-J. Davies, *Phrenology, Fad and Science* (New Haven, Conn., 1955),

*-M. Sandifer, "Some Psychiatric Observations on Literary Criticism," *Car Q.* 9 (1957), 43-44,

*-L. Levy, "Henry James' Confidence and the Development of the Idea of the Unconscious," *AL*, 28 (1956), 347-358.

From *The University of Kansas City Review*:

&-C. A. Ward, "The 'Good Myth'," XXIV, 4 (June 1958), 272-276. [The first of two articles on the subject, this one deals with the "myths" of the ante-bellum South as contained in works by "the Vanderbilt Agrarians," Allen Tate and John C. Ransom especially.]

From the *Johnsonian News Letter* (in the section devoted to a listing of new books):

&-G. Rattray Taylor, *The Angel-Makers: a Study of the Psychological Origins of Historical Change (1750-1850)* (London: Heinemann, 1958?).

From *The Explicator*:

&-Stanley B. Greenfield, "[Katherine] Mansfield's 'The Fly'," XVII, 1 (October 1958), No. 2 [A rather superficial explication of the symbolism of the fly in the story, with a perfunctory nod to psychodynamic levels of meaning at the conclusion.],

&-Martin Spevack, "Shakespeare's *King Lear*, IV, vi, 152," *Ibid.*, No. 4 [Levels of meaning in blind Gloucester's words, "I see it feelingly."],

&-Carl H. Ketcham, "Meredith's *Modern Love*, XXXI, 7-11, *Ibid.*, No. 7 [The "husband's" self-contempt implicit in the comparison with the dwarf "Count" Borowlaski.]

From *Modern Fiction Studies*:

&-Albert Cook, "Proust: The Invisible Stilts of Time," 4, 2 (Summer 1958), 118-126 ['A la fois Joseph et Pharon,' Marcel says, 'je me mis à interpréter mon rêve.'],

*-Robert Stanton, "'Daddy's Girl': Symbol and Theme in 'Tender Is the Night'," Ibid., 136-142 [This should be read in connection with Abraham Steinberg's papers on the same novel; see III, 2, 3-8, and V, 2, 38.],

&-George Woodcock, "Malcolm Lowry's 'Under the Volcano'," Ibid., 151-156,

%-Leon Edel, "Dorothy Miller Richardson, 1882-1957," Ibid. (in "Notes and Discussion"), 165-168.

In the "Modern Fiction Newsletter" Professor Beebe discusses various critical "fallacies," a new set of terms to be added to the now overworked "intentional fallacy" and "affective fallacy." He refers to Professor William York Tindall's introduction of "the exhaustive fallacy" in

&-"The Criticism of Fiction," Tex Q. I (Spring 1958).

Mr. Beebe's words of warning deserve quotation in this journal, in which criticism and explication may be specialized but do not ever, we hope, claim to be "exhaustive":

It is impossible...to analyze thoroughly even a short poem or story, let alone a novel, for we can hardly consider all its aspects or see it from every possible angle of vision simultaneously. Criticism, an act of co-operation between author and reader, is by its nature selective and thus partly subjective. Every interpretation is a distortion—some more than others, of course—and even when all interpretations are taken together, they cannot exhaust the entire work. Beware, then, the literary critic who shouts Eureka!—I have found the key—the mystery is solved—here is the work in its entirety. [p. 179]

[Ed. note: If the selection of this quotation by your editor sounds like critical comment on certain aspects of the leading article in this issue, that is wholly intentional and non-coincidental.]

Like Mr. Beebe, we should also note:

&-Marcel Proust, On Art and Literature 1896-1919 [Sylvia Townsend Warner's translation of Contre Sainte-Beuve.] (New York: Meridian Books, 1958),

&-Harry Levin, The Power of Blackness: Hawthorne, Poe, Melville (New York: Knopf, 1958),

%-Albert Mordell, Literary Reviews and Essays [by Henry James] on American, English, and French Literature (New York: Twayne Pubs., 1958) ["...Mordell apologizes for inconsistently appending to the volume a psychoanalytical interpretation of 'Mme. de Mauves'...." p. 187],

&-Robert Humphrey, Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel (Univ. of Calif. Press, paperback, 1958),

&-William York Tindall, The Literary Symbol (Indiana Univ. Press, paperback, 1958),

*-Ednita Bernabeu, "Science Fiction: A New Mythos," Psa Q. XVI (October 1957),

&-Lawrence E. Harvey, "The Utopia of Blindness in Gide's Symphonie Pastorale," M.P., February 1958,

&-Margaret Church, "Kafka and Proust: A Contrast in Time," Bu R. December, 1957 [See also VII, 4, 49].

The autumn issue of MFS is devoted to Dostoevsky:

*-Louise Dauner, "Raskolnikov in Search of a Soul," 4, 3, 199-210 [The approach is Jungian; even the title of the essay proclaims indebtedness to Modern Man In Search of a Soul.],

*-Simon O. Lesser, "Saint and Sinner—Dostoevsky's 'I idiot'," Ibid., 211-224 [The approach is Freudian—"In The Idiot, as in Don Quixote, the fundamental conflict is between the superego and the ego. ... His [Myshkin's] fatal flaw is an undeveloped ego: a sense of reality so deficient that it not only prevents him from accomplishing good, but causes him to fail everyone, himself included, in the long run and to leave behind him during his brief encounter with nineteenth century Russian society a trail of defeats and destruction. As Freud—and Dostoevsky—knew, the unbridled superego can be as dangerous as the id." p. 211]

&-Nathan Rosen, "Breaking out of the Underground: The 'Failure' of 'A Raw Youth'," Ibid., 225-239,

&-George Gibian, "The Grotesque in Dostoevsky," Ibid., 262-270 [The author notes in passing that "the grotesque [is associated] with the dark, subconscious irrational" and refers to its use not only by Dostoevsky and other Russians but also by Gautier, Baudelaire, Goethe, Thomas Mann, and Kafka.]

The Dostoevsky Checklist (271-291) has the following titles which seem to indicate some leaning toward psycho-literary criticism. We list them, however, with the warning that, as appears from the contents of the issue itself, it is practically impossible to write Dostoevsky criticism—or Mann criticism or Kafka criticism—without some reference to psychodynamics.

&-Arthur E. Adams, "Pobedonostsev's Thought Control," Rus R. XI (October 1952) 241-246,

*-Alfred Adler, The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology (tr. by P. Radin; London: Kegan Paul, 1924), 280-290,

&-Vladimir Astrov, "Hawthorne and Dostoevsky as Explorers of the Human Conscience," NEQ, XV (June 1942), 296-319,

*-J. D. Beresford, "Psycho-analysis and the Novel," Freeman, I (March 24, 1920), 35-39 [See also VI, 3, 78-86],

%-Edward Hallett Carr, "Was Dostoevsky an Epileptic?" Slavn R. IX (Dec., 1930), 424-431,

%-Joseph Collins, "Feodor Dostoevsky: Targelist, Prophet, and Psychologist," in Doctor Looks at Lit., (New York: Doran Co. 1923), 61-95,

*-Janko Lavrin, Dostoevsky and His Creation: A Psycho-Critical Study (London: Collins, 1920),

&-Thomas Mann, "Dostoevsky—in Moderation," in The Short Novels of Dostoevsky (New York: Dial Press, 1945), vii-xx,

&-Ralph E. Matlaw, "Recurrent Imagery in Dostoevsky," in Harvard Slav. Studies, Vol. III (Harv. Univ. Press, 1957), 201-225,

%-Ruth Mortimer, "Dostoevsky and the Dream," MP, LIV (Nov. 1956), 106-116,

&-Renato Poggioli, "Kafka and Dostoevsky," in Angel Flores, edtr., The Kafka Problem (New York: New Directions, 1946), 97-116,

&- - - - - , "Dostoevsky, or Reality and Myth," in The Phoenix and the Spider. . . (Harv. Univ. Press, 1957), 16-32,

*-George W. Thorn, "Dostoevsky as a Psychologist," London Q, CXXV (Apr. 1916), 177-188,

*-Mark Kanzer, "The Vision of Father Zossima," Amer. Imago, VIII (Dec. 1951), 329-335,

%-Maurice Beebe, "The Three Motives of Raskolnikov: A Reinterpretation of Crime and Punishment," CE, XVII (Dec. 1955), 151-158,

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I, 5 (May 1958):

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%-R. G. Geering, "Swift's Struldbruggs: the Critics Considered," AUMLA, No. 70, (Nov. 1957), 5-15 ["In this episode, Swift prepares the way for the closing stage of Gulliver's progress towards wisdom and self-knowledge."],

*-John A. Weigel, "What Kind of Psychology for Students of Literature," CEA, XX, 4 (Apr. 1958), 1 & 5,

%-Lawrence W. Hyman, "Marvell's Garden," ELH, XXV, 1 (March 1958), 13-22 ["Androgyne"],

&-Kenneth Burke, "The Poetic Motive," Hud R, XI, 1 (Spring 1958), 54-63,

%-Patrick Crutwell, "On Caleb Williams," Ibid., 87-95,

%-Paul H. Kocher, "Francis Bacon and His Father," HLQ, XXI, 2 (Feb. 1958), 133-158,

%-Howard S. Babb, "Dialogue with Feeling: A Note on Pride and Prejudice," KR, XX, 2 (Spring 1958), 203-216,

%-Leon Edel, "Time and The Ambassadors," MLN, LXXIII, 3 (March 1958), 177-179,

%-Bruce Ingham Granger, "Illusion and Reality in Eugene O'Neill," Ibid., 179-186,

%-Hanspeter Schelp, "Death in the Life and Work of John Keats," NS, 1 (1958), 1-13,

%-Abel and Hogan, "D. H. Lawrence's Singing Birds," Ibid., 2, 49-56,

&-John Henry Raleigh, "Victorian Mor-

als and the Modern Novel," PR, XXV, 2 (Spring 1958), 241-264,

*-Charles I. Glicksberg, "Depersonalization in the Modern Drama," Person, XXXIX, 2 (Spring 1958), 158-169 [Strindberg, Pirandello, Lenormand, O'Neill],

&-Barbara Seward, "Graham Greene, A Hint of an Explanation," WR, XXII, 2 (Winter 1958), 83-95,

*-Kenneth S. Lynn, "Huck and Jim," YR, XLVII, 3 (April 1958), 421-431.

I, 6 (June 1958):

%-Eliseo Vivas, "The Two Lawrences," Bu R, VII, (March 1958), 113-132 ["To explain why Lawrence changed from artist to propagandist would require thorough psychological analysis. Such factors as his sense of social inferiority, his alienation, his relationship with Jessie Chambers, his mother, and Frieda would have to be scrutinized minutely. A possible key may be found in his latent fear of homosexuality, especially as manifested in his traumatic overreaction to a medical examination in World War I."],

&-J. Mitchell Morse, "Baudelaire, Stephen Dedalus, and Shem the Penman," Ibid., 187-198,

&-Walter Gellhorn, "The Decision Nobody Noticed: The Supreme Court on Obscenity," Columbia Univ. Forum, I, 1 (Winter 1957), 38-41,

&-William York Tindall, "Beckett's Bums," Crit, II, 1 (Spring-Summer 1958), 3-15,

&-Herbert Howarth, "Pieces of History," Ibid., 54-64 ["The Novel of Historical Myth" exemplified in Rex Warner and Peter Vansittart],

&-T. B. Tomlinson, "Action and Soliloquy in Macbeth," EIC, VIII, 2 (April 1958), 147-155 [Shakespeare's "attempt to raise subtle introspection to the status of tragedy" must fail.],

%-E. B. Greenwood, "The Literary Criticism of Lionel Trilling," TC, CLXIII (Jan. 1958), 44-48,

&-Philip Thody, "Lewis Carroll and the Surrealists," Ibid. (May 1958), 427-434,

I, 7 (July 1958)

*-William Wiegand, "J. D. Salinger: Seventy-eight Bananas," Chi R, XI, 4 (Winter 1958), 3-19,

%-Park Tyler, "The Child as 'The Figure in the Carpet'," Ibid., 31-42,

&-Ralph Samuelson, "The Theme of Mrs. Dalloway," Ibid., 57-76,

&-Peter Thorslev, "The New Minority Novel," The Grad. Student of Eng., I, 3 (Spring 1958), 3-7 [Reasons for the popularity of the theme on homosexuality in current fiction],

&-Glenn Pedersen, "Blake's Urizen as Hawthorne's Ethan Brand," NCF, XII, 4 (March 1958), 304-314,

&-Norman N. Holland, "The Dumb-Show Revisited," N&Q, V, 5 (May 1958), 191 [It is the words accompanying the poisoning which cause Claudius to lose his self-control.],

*-Ludwig Jekels, "On the Psychology of Comedy," Tulane Drama Rev., II, 3 (May 1958), 7-22 [A psychoanalytic view of comedy based on the conviction that comedy rests on a mechanism of inversion of the father-son relationship].

I, 8 (August 1958):

*-David M. Rein, "Poe and Virginia Clemm," BuR, VII, 4 (May 1958), 207-216 [Poe's attitude toward his marriage is revealed in his stories.],

&-W. D. Snodgrass, "A Rocking Horse: The Symbol, the Pattern, the Way to Live," HudR, XI, 2 (Summer 1958), 191-200 [Extends the symbolism in Lawrence's short story psychologically, intellectually, even politically.],

%-Robert N. Wilson, "The Poet and the Projective Test," JAAC, XVI, 3 (March 1958), 319-327 [What happened when twenty well-known American poets wrote "completions" on a TAT.],

*-Walter Cerf, "Psychoanalysis and the Realistic Drama," Ibid., 328-336 [O'Neill, Long Day's Journey; Laurents, Clearing in the Woods],

&-Thomas Parkinson, "Intimate and Impersonal: An Aspect of Modern Poetics," Ibid., 373-383,

&-Gustav E. Mueller, "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century Novel," Ibid., 4 (June 1958), 471-481 ["The best modern American literature... tries [among other things] to recognize and assimilate the power of the irrational, so that by facing it one may learn to live with it."],

&-Jordan Y. Miller, "Eugene O'Neill's Long Journey," KM, 1958, 77-81,

&-Cyrus Day, "The Iceman and the Bridegroom: Some Observations on the Death of O'Neill's Salesman," Mod. Drama, I, 1 (May 1958), 3-9 ["Is there in dramatic literature a more nihilistic play than The Iceman Cometh?"],

%-Grove Smith, Jr., "The Doll-Burners: D. H. Lawrence and Louisa Alcott," MLQ, XIX, 1 (March 1958), 28-32 [Suggests that Lawrence used the doll-burning incident in Sons and Lovers, possibly suggested by Little Women, as "a symbol of male retaliation against female... ascendancy."],

&-Vincent Blehl, "The Holiness of John Henry Newman," The Month, CCV, 6 (June 1958), 325-334 [Newman's Autobiographical Writings seen as a sort of "psychological safety valve."],

&-Edmond L. Volpe, "James's Theory of Sex in Fiction," NCF, XIII, 1 (June 1958), 22-35,

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*-Alfred Kazin, "Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Literary Culture," 45, 1 & 2 (Spring-Summer 1958), 41-51,

&-Herbert Fingarette, "The Ego and Mystic Selflessness," Ibid., 5-40.

From The American Imago:

&-Kenneth J. Munden, "A Contribution to the Psychological Understanding of the Origin of the Cowboy and His Myth," 15, 2 (Summer 1958), 103-148,

*-P. J. Vinken [Amsterdam, Holland], "Some Observations on the Symbolism of The Broken Pot in Art and Literature," Ibid., 149-174 [A remarkable paper, with examples from Greuze, Kleist, Zschokke, French operettas, Leviticus, Greek mythology, the Andren Rewle, the Antwerps Liedboek, Jacob Cats, Jordaens, La Fontaine, the Pancatantra, Jacques Vitry, Nicolas Pergamemus, Pauly, Hans Sachs, the Gesta Romanorum, Gil Vicente, Fragonard, Geoffroy Tory, Salomon Gessner, Goya, Sully Prudhomme, and Spitzer, among others.],

&-Richard M. Jones, "The Return of the Un-Repressed," Ibid., 175-180 [A review of Marcuse's Eros and Civilization.],

&-L. Veszy-Wagner, "Serf Bálaazs: a Boy without the Dike; a Stage before the Solution of the Oedipal Conflict," Ibid., 181-193 [Comment on a Hungarian variant of the story of the boy who prevented a flood by stopping a hole in the dike with his finger.],

*-James A. S. McPeck, "Richard and His Shadow World," Ibid., 195-212 [Shakespeare: RIII],

&-Charles K. Hofling, "Notes on Raychaudhuri's 'Jesus Christ and Sree Krishna'," Ibid., 213-226,

&-William L. Langer, "The Next Assignment," Ibid., 3 (Fall 1958), 235-266 [The president of the American Historical Association discusses the impact of psychoanalysis on the social sciences, particularly on history and biography.]

From the News Letter of the Division of Esthetics, Amer. Psy. Assn.; Feb., 1958:

*-Harold G. McCurdy, "The Childhood Pattern of Genius," Jrnl. of the Elisha Mitchell Sci. Soc., Nov. 1957,

&-Erling Eng has "just completed an English translation of S. Lupasco's 'Le Principe d'antagorisme [sic] et la logique de l'energie,' the exposition of a symbolic logic of particular value for understanding Gestalten. In terms of this logic the spheres of aesthetics, ego functioning and psychology are coterminous."

&-W. G. Elias, "Die Echtheit des Kunstwerks, Ihre psychologie und Magie," in Die Internationale Kunstwerk (Adolph Donath, edtr.), Sept. 1935. ["The theory is that the genuine work of art, contrary to the accomplished reproduction or the accomplished counterfeit, establishes a contact between the personalities of the onlooker and the artist. Here is a basic fact which pervades all human interrelationships."]

Citations from other recent journals, including Contemporary Psychology and Psychological Abstracts, will have to be deferred until the next issue.

